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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2414 
___________ 
 
EDWARD J. MIERZWA, 
                                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SAFE & SECURE SELF STORAGE, LLC; XL REINSURANCE AMERICA; 
GREENWICH INS CO; DEANS AND HOMER; CRAWFORD AND COMPANY; 
GOLDBERG SEGALLA, LLP; MIRANDA SAMBURSKY SLONE SKLARIN 
VERVENOITIS, LLP; HENRY NEIL PORTNER, ESQ.; STEVEN S. VAHIDI, ESQ.; 
DAVID S. OSTERMAN, ESQ.; SARA FANG, ESQ.; STEPHEN J. ROMANO, ESQ.; 
MICHAEL MIRANDA, ESQ.; PALA PINTO 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-01274) 
District Judge:  Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 26, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: August 17, 2012 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Edward Mierzwa, pro se, appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing 
his amended complaint as frivolous and denying reconsideration of a prior order 
dismissing the original complaint without prejudice.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm. 
 This action arises out of Mierzwa’s insurance claim for property damage caused 
by a water leak at the facility where he rented a storage unit.  Mierzwa filed a complaint 
in the District Court for the District of New Jersey against his property insurer and its 
parent company, the insurer’s managing agent, the claims adjuster, the storage facility, 
and the individual attorneys and law firms that represented these defendants in Mierzwa’s 
state court action.  The complaint alleged that the insurer, “in conjunction with” the 
storage facility, committed insurance fraud; that the claims adjuster was not properly 
licensed and performed “an incomplete inspection” of Mierzwa’s damaged property; and 
that the attorney defendants “in bad faith” filed “frivolous court papers” in the state court 
action, including ones containing “a myriad of false and misleading statements.”  
According to Mierzwa, the defendants “willfully and wantonly engaged in unlawful 
business practices across state lines,” violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO).  He alleged that defendants’ “actions and inactions . . . 
constitute[d] a civil conspiracy, juxtaposing chain & wheel methodologies; all for the 
purpose of defrauding Plaintiff and the deprivation of Civil Rights upon Plaintiff.”  The 
complaint did not provide when, where, or between whom any alleged illicit agreement 
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was made; nor did it specify what conduct allegedly constituted insurance fraud, what 
“false and misleading statements” defendants allegedly made, how the court papers filed 
by the attorney defendants were allegedly frivolous, or how the defendants allegedly 
violated his civil rights.   
 In granting Mierzwa in forma pauperis status, the District Court sua sponte 
reviewed the complaint for frivolousness and failure to state a claim pursuant to its 
screening responsibilities under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The District Court concluded 
that the complaint failed to raise a valid federal claim because it did not allege the 
existence of an enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity required to state a civil 
RICO claim.  The District Court further held that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) did not provide a 
basis for subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint failed to allege complete 
diversity of citizenship.1
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Mierzwa moved for reconsideration and filed a proposed amended 
complaint that was essentially identical to the original complaint, adding neither 
  By order entered April 19, 2011, the District Court dismissed 
the complaint without prejudice and warned that failure to timely file an amended 
complaint comporting with the order would result in dismissal pursuant to  
                                              
1 Although Mierzwa cited § 1332(a) as the basis for jurisdiction, he failed to allege the 
citizenship of each party.  Instead, the complaint provided only an address of residence in 
New Jersey for plaintiff and a “business address,” “principal business address,” or 
“corporate headquarters” address for each defendant.  Several of these alleged business 
addresses are in the state of New Jersey.  The District Court appears to have construed 
these allegations as providing that plaintiff and some of the defendants are citizens of 
New Jersey for jurisdictional purposes. 
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substantive allegations nor allegations to establish diversity of citizenship.2
 Mierzwa timely appealed and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District Court’s 
dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary.  
  By order 
entered May 10, 2011, the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, 
dismissed the amended complaint as frivolous, and ordered the case closed.   
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 
223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Where no substantial question is presented by the appeal, we may 
summarily affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See
 We accordingly turn to Mierzwa’s amended complaint to determine if it has 
pleaded enough facts to state a federal claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  
 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6.   
See 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  To meet the Twombly 
plausibility standard, a complaint must include “more than labels and conclusions”; the 
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”  Id. at 555.  A claim for civil RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) must allege: “(1) 
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”  In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Moreover, where the plaintiff presents a fraud-based RICO claim, he must 
plead with particularity the circumstances of the alleged fraud.  See
                                              
2 Other than changing the alleged “business address” of two defendants and deleting an 
alleged additional office address for another defendant, Mierzwa made no changes to his 
original, defective jurisdictional allegations.      
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); 
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Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other 
grounds by Twombly
 Against these pleading requirements, we agree with the District Court that 
Mierzwa clearly failed to state a federal claim for relief.  The facts alleged do not 
plausibly imply a RICO enterprise or a pattern of racketeering activity.  
, 550 U.S. at 557.   
See, e.g., In re 
Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 369-72 (detailing the requirements for pleading the enterprise 
and conduct elements of a RICO claim).  Mierzwa’s conclusory allegations that 
defendants conspired for the purpose of defrauding him are simply inadequate to plead a 
valid RICO claim.3  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-67; In re Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 
374.  Thus, Mierzwa’s federal claims were properly dismissed.4
 To the extent that Mierzwa was attempting to bring any state law claims, the 
District Court correctly concluded it lacked diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
   
                                              
3 To the extent Mierzwa intended to bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) for 
conspiring to violate a substantive provision of RICO, such a claim fails for the same 
reasons.  See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Any claim under section 1962(d) based on a conspiracy to violate the other subsections 
of section 1962 necessarily must fail if the substantive claims are themselves deficient.”). 
  
4 Mierzwa’s complaint also cited 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as a basis for his claims against the 
attorney defendants and their clients.  Liberally construed, the complaint appears to allege 
that these defendants conspired to obstruct justice in the state court action, in violation of 
the second clause of § 1985(2), by filing frivolous court papers.  Although the District 
Court did not explicitly address this claim, it is easily dismissed as meritless.  See Davis 
v. Twp. of Hillside, 190 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim under the 
second clause of § 1985(2) requires racial or otherwise class-based, invidiously 
discriminatory intent); Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that attorneys are exempt from conspiracy charges under § 1985 for actions taken in the 
course of representing their clients, even if the actions were unethical). 
 
6 
 
1332(a) because complete diversity of citizenship was not apparent from the pleadings.5  
See Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 222 n.13 
(3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the plaintiff has the burden of pleading jurisdiction and must 
state each party’s citizenship so that complete diversity can be confirmed); Schultz v. 
Cally, 528 F.2d 470, 473 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that allegations of individual defendant 
attorney’s business address and state of residence were insufficient to establish elements 
of claimed diversity jurisdiction).   With no evidence in the record to indicate that the 
parties are actually diverse, dismissal of any remaining claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction was appropriate.  See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 
U.S. 826, 831-32 (1989) (holding that statute allowing amendment for defective 
allegations of jurisdiction “addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that 
actually exists, and not defects in the jurisdictional facts themselves”); Wymard v. 
McCloskey & Co.
                                              
5 Complete diversity of citizenship requires that no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state 
as any defendant.  Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 
2010).  For the limited liability company and limited liability partnership defendants, 
diversity jurisdiction is determined by the citizenship of each of their members.  
Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420; Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The corporate defendants are deemed to be citizens of both their state of 
incorporation and the state of their principal place of business.  Swiger, 540 F.3d at 182.  
And the natural persons are citizens of their state of domicile.  Id.  Mierzwa failed to 
plead these requisite jurisdictional facts.   
 
, 342 F.2d 495, 497 (3d Cir. 1965) (finding no diversity jurisdiction 
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where complaint lacked allegations necessary to determine citizenship and plaintiff was 
given opportunity to amend but stood on its original pleadings).6
 Even construing Mierzwa’s pro se amended complaint liberally and in a light most 
favorable to him, we are unable to divine any viable federal claims for relief or basis for 
diversity jurisdiction.   Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  In light of 
our decision, Appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  
 
See Tabron v. 
Grace
                                              
6 Having concluded that Mierzwa failed to state any federal claims for relief, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over any remaining claims.  See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 
169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009). 
, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993). 
